

- Mature security approach
- Knowledge widely available

The process control systems

operate between the business

systems requirements for real time

access to data about production processes

forced Control Systems to interconnect with

business networks and other external systems, which generated major security issues.

► The information is protected (confidentiality first)

Main components

Vendors

- Application servers
- Database servers
- Workstations













budget is 10 times bigger than in IT!

Specific industrial knowledge

- Newly recognized area of concern
- Different approach to security
- The process is protected (Availability first)
 - Control servers
 - PHD servers
 - **Data historians**
 - Alarm system servers
 - HMI (Human Machine Interface)
 - Engineering workstations
 - RTU (Remote Terminal Unit) stations
 - ► PLC (Programmable Logic Controllers)

Vendors

Main

components







Rockwell

SIEMENS

Honeywell

♦ YOKOGAWA

ALLEN-BRADLEY



GISS 2016 global key findings - Energy Sector


of the most commonly used IoT devices contain vulnerabilities.

HP study reveals 70% of Internet of Things devices vulnerable to attack. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://h30499.www3.hp.com/ t5/Fortify-Application-Security/HP-Study-Reveals-70-Percentof-Internet-of-Things-Devices/ba-p/6556284#.VHMpw4uUfVc





of organizations claim to have a robust incident response program that includes third parties and law enforcement and is integrated with their broader threat and vulnerabilit management function.**






of respondents say that it is "unlikely or highly unlikely" that their organization would be able to detect a sophisticated attack.**



70% of incidents are detected by a third party



You can not detect what you can not see



Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Host Enumeration	Lateral Movement	Execution	C2	Exfiltration
Legitimate Credentials			Credential	Account	Application	Command	Commonly	Automated
Accessibility Features Binary		Dumping	enumeration	deployment	Line	used port	or scripted	
AddMonitor		Padding DLL Side-	Credentials	File system	software	File Access	Comm	exfiltration
DLL Search		Loading	in Files	enumeration	Exploitation of	PowerShell	through removable	Data
Edit Default File Handlers		Disabling	Network	Group	Vulnerability	Process	media	compressed Data
	New Service		Sniffing User	permission enumeration	Logon	Hollowing	Custom	encrypted Data size
Path Interception		Tools File System			scripts Pass the	Registry	application	limits
	Scheduled Task		Interaction			Rundli32	layer	Data staged
Service File		Logical Offsets		network	hash Pass the	Scheduled	protocol	-
Weakness		Process		connection enumeration	ticket Peer connections Remote	Task Service	Custom	Exfil over C2 channel
Shortcut M	Shortcut Modification						cipher Data	Exfil over
BIOS	D					Manipulation		alternate
	DLL Inj				Desktop	Third Party	obfuscation Fallback	channel to
Hypervisor Rootkit	Exploitation	Indicator		enumeration	Protocol	Software		C2 network Exfil over
ROOLKIL	of	blocking on		Operating	Windows management		channels Multiband	other
Logon Scripts	Vulnerability	host Indicator		system	instrum	_	comm Multilayer	network
Master Boot		removal from		enumeration	Windows remote		encryption Peer	medium
Record		tools		Owner/User	manag	management		Exfil over
Mod. Exist'g		Indicator		enumeration	Remote		connections Standard app	physical
Service		removal from		Process	Services Replication		layer	medium
Registry Run		host Masquerad-		enumeration	through		protocol	From local
Keys				Security	removable		Standard	system
Serv. Reg. Perm.		ing NTFS		software	media		non-app	From
Weakness		Extended		enumeration	Shared		layer	network
Windows Mgmt		Attributes Obfuscated		Service	webroot Taint shared		protocol Standard	resource
Instr. Event		Pavload		enumeration			encryption	From
Subsc. Winlogon Helper		Rootkit		Window	content Windows		cipher	removable
DLL		Rundll32		enumeration	admin		Uncommonly	media
		Scripting			shares		used port	Scheduled
		Software						transfer
		Packing						

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Security Visibility Approaches in MENA


Taking Security Operation Centers (SOCs) as an Example

MENA Organizations opt for:

- 1. Integrated SOCs (ISOC) (covering IT/OT/Physical Security)
- 2. Separate SOCs
- 3. Managed SOCs

Integrated SOCs A- Full Integration

Architecture Models (Fully Integrated)



Pros vs Cons

Pros:

- ✓ Provides real-time situational awareness across the entire enterprise
- ✓ Easier detection of cross-business unit incidents
- ✓ Develops internal capabilities for true Corporate wide IH
- ✓ Supports an intelligence-driven approach to incident detection
- Unified view on IH and Patch management..etc


Cons:

- Requires staff to be experts in multiple business units (corporate IT and OT domains)
- Requires staff to be well trained to provide incident response capabilities and forensics support to different business units.
- Corporate Politics and culture can be a challenge

People

Integrated SOCs B- Distributed Integration

Architecture Models (Distributed Model)



Pros vs Cons

Pros:

- ✓ Reduces likelihood of false positives for ISOC since only critical alarms are brought to their attention
- √ Less corporate politics
- ✓ No need for 1 team knows all (Easier to get)

Cons:

- ISOC does not have a real-time view across the enterprise, making it difficult to correlate events and alarms that may appear non-critical
- Staff must develop detailed policies and procedures for each business unit to identify critical alarms that should be brought to the ISOC's attention. (Hand-over)

Process


2x CapEx

Separate ICS SOC

OT SOC Services

- Automated Maturity & Compliance Reporting
- Asset Inventory & Configuration Management
- Standardised External Access Control
- Patch Management
- Anti-Virus Management
- Log Collection

Treating the IT as an untrusted 3rd party



Pros vs Cons

Pros:

- ✓ Solves the corporate politics
- ✓ Comfort zone for your technical staff (IT/OT)
- ✓ Least false positives

Cons:

- Much Bigger Investment
- No corporate wide visibility
- Different security levels

Various SOC Deployment models analysis


Service Maturity Level: ■ High ■ Medium ■ Low

Service attributes	100% In-house	Traditional MSSP/Outsource	SOC/CSIRT Staff Augmentation	EY Managed OT SOC	EY Build On-Premise (IT and OT)	Managed EY Digital SOC (IT, OT and IoT)
Speed to effectiveness	Years	N/A	Months to year	Months	Months (EY build & handover)	Months
People						
Service team	On-premise	100% remote	On-premise and remote team	On-premise and remote team (International)	Build and handover	On premise and remote team (based in GCC)
Resource competency	Material gaps	High	High	High	Skill gaps (OT)	High
Service availability	Business hours only	24/7/365 "eyes on glass"	24/7/365 = "on call" for "critical" alerts	24/7/365 "eyes on glass"	Business hours	24x7
Incident response	Material skill gaps	Often not included	Optional	Included	Included	Included
Process					With EY Input	
Process effectiveness	Low	High	High	High	High (EY IP)	High
Team integration	Material gaps exist	Low	High	High	Medium	High
Business context	High	Low	High	High	High	Strategic
Reports/metrics	Minimal to none or operational focus	Provider SLA focused	Material gaps	Strategic and operational insight	Medium (EY IP)	SLA ensured
Advanced threat	Commodity malware focus	Commodity malware OR APT focused	Commodity malware focused	Cover threat/attack spectrum	Commodity/APT (EY IP)	APT/Covert and bigger attack spectrum
Technology					IT/ OT convergence	
Network visibility	Perimeter, traditional IDS	Perimeter, traditional IDS	Perimeter, traditional IDS	Perimeter and internal, content/session inspection	Internal, perimeter & OT EY Architecture)	Internal, perimeter, OT & IoT
Endpoint/server visibility	Minimal to no capability	Often not included	Minimal to no capability	"Always on" monitoring & "on demand" host analysis	High (EY Architecture)	High
Data loss detection	Minimal to no capability	Often not included	Minimal to no capability	Client data exfiltration detection	Optional (not focus for OT)	Optional (not focus for OT / IoT)
Log management/search	Poorly tuned SIEM	"Black box" SIEM	Poorly tuned SIEM	Well tuned SIEM + analytics/efficient search	High	High
Speed to deployment	Months to years	Weeks	Months to years	Weeks to months	Months	Months
Capital investment	High	Low	High	Low to moderate (Hardware)	High (Opex and Capex)	Moderate (Capex)
Your access to your data	High	Minimal to no access (portal only)	High	High	High	High



CSIRT: Computer Security Incident

Response Team




The D-SOC Approach

Digital SOCs will enhance the capabilities and value propositions beyond traditional SOCs.

Digital SOCs will provide an end to end threat visibility and awareness, this is essential for today's and tomorrow's


hyper connected world.





Next Generation Security Operations

Next Generation security operations operating model







PathScan: A behavioral approach

Identify shapes of anomalous activity in the network in near real time


Paths are used to identify anomalous traversal activity



Stars are used to identify recon and insider threat activity



Example: Attack Kill Chain



- ▶ Highest-maturity SOCs have deeply embedded functional awareness of their organization's high-value assets and external threat factors.
- ► They integrate threat intelligence, security monitoring, incident response and network and application vulnerability management to understand likely advanced attack paths and deploy counter-measures.
- ▶ By infusing the SOC with actionable threat intelligence, the organization maps the attackers' likely paths and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to its most critical assets.



Example: Attack Kill Chain – Attacker Profiling


	Typical attack life-cycle									
	Intelligence gathering	Initial exp	Initial exploitation		Command and control		Privilege escalation		Data exfiltration	
	Background research	Initial attack	Establish foothold	Enable persistence	Enterprise recon	Move laterally	Escalate privilege	Gather and encrypt data	Steal data	
Tactics	➤ Google ➤ Public releases ➤ External scanning	➤ Zero days ➤ Social engineering ➤ Spear phishing ➤ Water holing	Malware installationStolen credentials	 ▶ Root kits ▶ Trojans ▶ Account creation ▶ Establish VPNs 	► Network scanning	➤ Stolen credentials ➤ Remote desktop connections	➤ Root kits ➤ Trojans ➤ Account creation	► FTP and email ► ZIP & RAR Compression ► Malware encryption	► FTP and email ► Web posting ► Encrypted C2 tunnels	
Organized crime Y										
Targets	Web serversExternal appsSocial media	➤ Executives and assistants ➤ Remote workers	➤ Work- stations ➤ Web servers	Security applicationsOperating systems	➤ Shares ➤ Work- stations ➤ Servers ➤ Routers	➤ Shares ➤ Work- stations ➤ Servers ➤ Routers	➤ Admin accounts ➤ Servers ➤ Routers	➤ Shares ➤ Work- stations ➤ Servers ➤ pdf, doc, xls, ppt	➤ pdf, doc, xls, ppt ➤ R&D data	



it's a journey

Convergence Road Map

Charting the path forward



Taking the proper steps towards achieving the Digital convergence security vision requires two timelines: a long-term strategic roadmap and an actionable short-term implementation plan. Key considerations during this process include:

- 1. There are logical dependencies between initiatives that must be addressed in the roadmap.
- Certain initiatives should be considered pre-requisites. (such as Asset Management Programs)
- Convergence plans are complex, highly intertwined programs. When it's time to execute, strong program management is required.



